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We present a new efficient paradigm for signing digital streams. The problem of signing digital
streams to prove their authenticity is substantially different from the problem of signing regular mes-
sages. Traditional signature schemes are message oriented and require the receiver to process the entire
message before being able to authenticate its signature. However, a stream is a potentially very long (or
infinite) sequence of bits that the sender sends to the receiver and the receiver is required to consume
the received bits at more or less the input rate and without excessive delay. Therefore it is infeasible for
the receiver to obtain the entire stream before authenticating and consuming it. Examples of streams
include digitized video and audio files, data feeds, and applets. We present two solutions to the problem
of authenticating digital streams. The first one is for the case of a finite stream which is entirely known
to the sender (say a movie). We use this constraint to devise an extremely efficient solution. The second
case is for a (potentially infinite) stream which is not known in advance to the sender (for example a live
broadcast). We present proofs of security of our constructions. Our techniques also have applications
in other areas, for example, efficient authentication of long files when communication is at a cost and
signature-based filtering at a proxy server. C° 2001 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures (see [10, 22]) are the cryptographic answer to the problem of information au-
thenticity. When a recipient receives digitally signed information and she is able to verify the digital
signature then she can be certain that the information received is exactly the same as what the sender
(identified by his public key) has signed. Moreover, this guarantee is nonrepudiable; i.e., the entity iden-
tified by the public key cannot later deny having signed the information. Thus, the recipient can hold
the signer responsible for the content she receives. This distinguishes digital signatures from message
authentication codes (MAC) which allow the receiver to have confidence on the identity of the sender,
but not to prove to someone else this fact; i.e., MAC’s are repudiable.
However, current digital signature technology was designed to ensure message authentication and its
straightforward application does not yield a satisfactory solution when applied to information resources
which are not message-like. In this paper we discuss one such type of resource: streams. We point out
shortcomings in several approaches (some of them used in practice) to tackle the problem of signing
streams and then present our solution which does not have such shortcomings.
1.1 Streams Defined
A stream is a potentially very long (infinite) sequence of bits that a sender sends to a receiver. The
stream is usually sent at a rate which is negotiated between the sender and the receiver or there may be
a demand-response protocol in which the receiver repeatedly sends requests for an additional (finite)
amount of data. The main feature of streams which distinguish them from messages is that the receiver
must consume the data it receives at more or less the input rate, i.e., it cannot buffer large amounts
of unconsumed data. In fact in many applications the receiver stores relatively very small amounts of
the stream. In some cases the sender itself may not store the entire sequence, i.e., it may not store the
information it has already sent out and it may not know anything about the stream much beyond of what
it has sent out.
There are many examples of digital streams. Common examples include digitized video and audio
which is now routinely transported over the Internet and also to television viewers via various means,
1A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of CRYPTO’97.
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e.g., via direct broadcast satellites and very shortly via cable, wireless cable, telephone lines, etc. This
includes both prerecorded and stored audio–video programming as well as live feeds. Apart from audio–
video, there are also data feeds (e.g., news feeds, stock market quotes, etc.) which are best modeled as
a stream. The Internet and the emerging interactive TV industry also provide another example of an
information resource which is best modeled as a stream, i.e., applets. Most nontrivial applets are actually
very large programs which are organized into several modules. The consumer’s machine first downloads
and executes the startup module and as the program proceeds, additional modules are downloaded and
executed. Also, modules that are no longer in use may be discarded by the consumer machine. This
structure of applets is forced by two factors. First, the amount of storage available on the consumer
machine may be limited (e.g., in the emerging interactive TV industry set-top boxes have to be cheap and
therefore resource limited). Second (in the case of the Internet), the bandwidth available to download
code may be limited and applets must be designed to start executing as soon as possible. Also it is
quite likely that some of the more sophisticated applets may have data-rich components generated
on the fly by the applet server. Therefore applets fit very nicely into the demand–response streams
paradigm.
Given the above description, it is clear that message-oriented signature schemes cannot be directly
used to sign streams since the receiver cannot be expected to receive the entire stream before verifying
the signature. If a stream is infinitely long (e.g., the 24-hour news channel), then it is impossible for the
receiver to receive the entire stream and even if a stream is finite but long the receiver would have to
violate the constraint that the stream needs to be consumed at roughly the input rate and without delay.
1.2 Previous Solutions and Their Shortcomings
To the authors’ knowledge there has been no proposed specific solution to the problem of signing
digital streams in the crypto literature. One can envision several possible solutions, some of them are
actually proposed to be used in practice.
One type of solution splits the stream into blocks. The sender signs each individual block and the
receiver loads an entire block and verifies its signature before consuming it. This solution also works
if the stream is infinite. However, this solution forces the sender to generate a signature for each block
of the stream and the receiver to verify a signature for each block. With today’s signature schemes
either one or both of these operations can be very expensive computationally, which in turns means
that the operations of signing and verifying can create a bottleneck to the transmission rate of the
stream.
Another type of solution works only for finite streams which are known in advance. In this case,
once again the stream is split into blocks. Instead of signing each block, the sender creates a table
listing cryptographic hashes of each of the blocks and signs this table. When the receiver asks for the
authenticated stream, the sender first sends the signed table followed by the stream. The receiver first
receives and stores this table and verifies the signature on it. If the signature matches then the receiver
has the authenticated cryptographic hash of each of blocks in the stream and thus each block can be
verified when it arrives. The problem with this solution is that it requires the storage and maintenance of
a potentially very large table on the receiver’s end. In many realistic scenarios the receiver buffer is very
limited compared to the size of the stream, (e.g., in MPEG a typical movie may be 20 Gbytes whereas
the receiver buffer is only required to be around 250 Kbytes). Therefore the hash table can itself become
fairly large (e.g., 50,000 entries in this case or 800 Kbytes for the MD5 hash function) and it may not be
possible to store the hash table itself. Also, the hash table itself needs to be transmitted first and if it is too
large then there will be a significant delay before the first piece of the stream is received and consumed.
To address the problem of large tables one can also come up with a hybrid scheme in which the stream
is split into consecutive pieces and each piece is preceded by a small signed table of contents.2
The above solution can be further modified by using an authentication tree: the blocks are placed as
the leaves of a binary tree and each internal node takes as a value the hash of its children (see [17]). This
way the sender needs to sign and send only the root of this tree. However, in order to authenticate each
2 This is the case now (Java Developer Kit 1.1) for large signed Java applets which are distributed as a collection of Java
archives (JAR) where each archive has a signed table of hashes of contents and the archives are loaded in the order given in the
HTML page in which the applet is embedded.
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following block the sender has to send the whole authentication path (i.e., the nodes on the path from
the root to the block, plus their siblings) to the receiver. This means that if the stream has k blocks, the
authentication information associated with each block will be O(log k).
As we will see briefly our solution eliminates all these shortcomings. The basic idea works for both
infinite and finite streams, only one expensive digital signature is ever computed, there are no big tables
to store, and the size of the authentication information associated with each block does not depend on
the size of the stream.
Digital Signatures vs Simple Authentication. Notice that if the receiver were only interested in
establishing the identity of the sender, a solution based on MAC would suffice. Indeed, once the
sender and receiver share a secret key, the stream could be authenticated block by block using a MAC
computation on it. Since MACs are usually faster than signatures to compute and verify, this solution
would not incur the computational cost associated with the similar signature-based solution described
above.
However, a MAC-based approach would not enjoy the nonrepudiation property. We stress that we
require such a property for our solution. Also, in order for this property to be meaningful in the context
of streams we need to require each prefix of the stream to be nonrepudiable. That is, if the stream is
B D B1; B2; : : : where each Bi is a block, we require that each prefix Bi D B1 : : : Bi be nonrepudiable.
This rules out a solution in which the sender just attaches a MAC to each block and then signs the whole
stream at the end.
This is to prevent the sender from interrupting the transmission of the stream before the nonre-
pudiability property is achieved. Also it is a guarantee for the receiver. Consider indeed the follow-
ing scenario: the receiver notices that the applets he or she is downloading are producing damages
to his or her machine. The receiver interrupts the transfer in order to limit the damage, but still
wants some proof to bring to court that the substream downloaded so far did indeed come from the
sender.
In general nonrepudiation is crucial when the stream is being sold as electronic merchandise. With
the advent of music and video distribution over the Internet, it is clear that such transactions must be
protected with mechanisms that allow the resolution of disputes through nonrepudiation.
There are other reasons why a solution based on digital signatures could be preferable to one based
on MACs. Consider, for example, the case in which content is being broadcasted to a large number of
people which changes over time. In this scenario (even if nonrepudiation is not required) to simply sign
the content may end up being the simplest and most efficient solution, since it avoids problems of key
management among a large number of users.
1.3 Our Solution in a Nutshell
Our solution makes some reasonable and practical assumptions about the nature of the streams being
authenticated. First of all we assume that it is possible for the sender to embed authentication information
in the stream. This is usually the case; see Section 8 to see how to do this in most real-world situations
such as MPEG video–audio. We also assume that the receiver has a “small” buffer in which it can
first authenticate the received bits before consuming them. Finally we assume that the receiver has
processing power or hardware that can compute a small number of fast cryptographic checksums faster
than the incoming stream rate while still being able to play the stream in real-time.
The basic idea of our solution is to divide the stream into blocks and embed some authentication
information in the stream itself. The authentication information of the i th block will be used to authen-
ticate the (i C 1)st block. This way the signer needs to sign just the first block and then the properties of
this single signature will “propagate” to the rest of the stream through the authentication information.
Of course the key problem is to perform the authentication of the internal blocks fast. We distinguish
two cases.
In the first scenario the stream is finite and is known in its entirety to the signer in advance. This is
not a very limiting requirement since it covers most of the Internet applications (digital movies, digital
sounds, applets). In this case we will show that a single hash computation will suffice to authenticate
the internal blocks. The idea is to embed in the current block a hash of the following block (which in
turns includes the hash of the following one and so on).
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The second case is for (potentially infinite) streams which are not known in advance to the signer
(for example live feeds such as sports event broadcasting and chat rooms). In this case our solution is
less optimal as it requires several hash computations to authenticate a block (although depending on the
embedding mechanism these hash computations can be amortized over the length of the block). The
size of the embedded authentication information is also an issue in this case. The idea here is to use
fast 1-time signature schemes (introduced in [15, 16]) to authenticate the internal blocks. So block i
will contain a 1-time public key and also the 1-time signature of itself with respect to the key contained
in block i ¡ 1. This signature authenticates not only the stream block but also the 1-time key attached
to it.
1.4 Related Work
The “chaining” technique of embedding the hash of the following block in the current block can be
seen as a variation of the Merkle–Damga˚rd meta-method to construct hash functions based on a simpler
compression function [9, 18]. The novelty here is that we exploit the structure of the construction to
allow fast authentication of single blocks in sequential order. A similar idea had been used in the context
of time-stamping mechanisms by Haber and Stornetta [14]. It can also be seen as a weak construction of
accumulators as introduced in [4]. An accumulator for k blocks B1; : : : ; Bk is a single value ACC that
allows a signer to quickly authenticate any of the blocks in any particular order. Accumulators based
on the RSA assumption were proposed in [4]. In our case we have a much faster construction based on
collision–free hash functions, since we exploit the property that the blocks must be authenticated in a
specific order.
The proofs of security of our schemes are somewhat similar to a proof by Damga˚rd in [8] of the
general result that combining a secure signature scheme and a collision intractable hash function yields
a secure signature scheme.
Mixing “regular” signatures with 1-time signatures, for the purpose of improving efficiency, is dis-
cussed in [12]. However, in that paper the focus is in making the signing operation of a message M
efficient by dividing it into two parts. An offline part in which the signer signs a 1-time public key with
his long-lived secret key even before the messages M is known. Then when M has to be sent the signer
computes a 1-time signature of M with the authenticated 1-time public key and sends out M tagged
with the 1-time public key and the two signatures. Notice that the receiver must compute two signature
verifications: one on the long-lived key and one on the 1-time key. In our scheme we need to make both
signing and verification extremely fast, and indeed in our case each block (except for the first) is signed
(and hence verified) only once with a 1-time key.
We also use the idea of using old keys in order to authenticate new keys. This has appeared in
several places but always for long-lived keys. Examples include [2, 20, 24] where this technique is
used to build provably secure signature schemes. We stress that the results in [2, 20, 24] are mostly of
theoretical interest and do not yield practical schemes. Our online solution somehow mixes these two
ideas in a novel way, by using the chaining technique with 1-time keys, embedding the keys inside the
stream flow so that old keys can authenticate at the same time both the new keys and the current stream
block.
2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Subsequent to the publication of a preliminary version of this work in CRYPTO’97, there has been
a lot of research activity in the area of source authentication techniques for multicast communications,
some of which is applicable to the problem of stream signing. Authenticating the sender of data packets
is a fundamental security issue in multicast, and to date, no completely satisfactory solution is known
for this problem. Techniques such as the use of MACs, which work well for unicast settings, are
completely insecure in multiple receiver settings and much research has focused on the design of
efficient signature schemes for multicast packet authentication. At first glance, it appears that the stream
signing work presented in this paper should be applicable to this problem. However, it turns out that on
the Internet, most multicast data travel over an unreliable transport and thus the techniques developed
in this paper are not directly applicable since they assume reliability. On the other hand, some of
the efficient signature mechanisms developed for multicast packet authentication [23, 26] could be
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used in conjunction with the techniques presented in this paper to yield even better stream signing
techniques.
3. PRELIMINARIES
In the following we denote with n the security parameter. We say that a function †(n) is negligible if
for every c there exists an n0 such that, for all n > n0, †(n) < 1=nc.
Collision-Resistant Hash Functions. LetH be a family of functions that map arbitrarily long binary
strings into binary strings of a fixed length k. We say that H is a collision-resistant family of hash
functions if any polynomial time algorithm that is given as input a description of a random element
H 2 H finds a collision, i.e., a pair (x; y) such that x 6D y and H (x) D H (y), only with negligible
probability †(k).
MD5 [21] and SHA-1 [19] are conjectured collision-resistant hash functions, i.e., random represen-
tatives of a familyH with the above property.
Signature Schemes. A signature scheme is a triplet (G; S; V ) of probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms satisfying the following properties:
† G is the key generation algorithm. On input 1n it outputs a pair (SK, PK ) 2 f0; 1g2n . SK is
called the secret (signing) key and PK is called the public (verification) key.
† S is the signing algorithm. On input a message M and the secret key SK, it outputs a signature ¾ .
† V is the verification algorithm. For every (PK, SK) D G(1n) and ¾ D S(SK;M), it holds that
V (PK; ¾;M) D 1.
In [13] security for signature schemes is defined in several variants. The strongest variant is called
“existential unforgeability against adaptively chosen message attack.” That is, we require that no
efficient algorithm will be able to produce a valid signed message, even after seeing several signed
messages of its choice.
One-Time Signatures. A special kind of signature schemes satisfy the [13] definition of security
only if we allow the adversary to see a limited number of signed messages. In particular there exists
signature schemes that are secure only if used to sign a single message. The main advantage of this type
of schemes is that they are usually much faster to execute than regular signature schemes.
Stream Signatures. We define a stream to be a (possibly infinite) sequence of blocksB D B1; B2; : : :
where each Bi 2 f0; 1gc for some constant 3 c.
We distinguish two cases. In the first case we assume that the stream is finite and known to the sender
in advance. We call this the offline case. Conversely in the online case the signer must process one (or
a few) block at the time with no knowledge of the future part of the stream.
DEFINITION 1. An offline stream signature scheme is a triplet (G; S; V ) of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms satisfying the following properties:
† G is the key generation algorithm. On input 1n it outputs a pair (SK;PK ) 2 f0; 1g2n . SK is
called the secret (signing) key and PK is called the public (verification) key.
† S is the signing algorithm. On input a finite stream B D B1; : : : ; Bk and the secret key SK
algorithm S outputs a new stream B0 D B 01; : : : ; B 0k where B 0i D (Bi ; Ai ).
† V is the verification algorithm. For every (PK; SK ) D G(1n) and B0 D S(SK;B), it holds that
V (PK; B 01; : : : ; B 0i ) D 1 for 1 • i • k.
Notice that we modeled the offline property by the fact that the signing algorithm is given the whole
stream in advance, yet the verifier is required to authenticate each prefix of the scheme without needing
to see the rest of the stream. As will become clear, our algorithms will not require the offline verifier to
store the whole past stream either.
3 The assumption that the blocks are all the same size is not really necessary. We just make it for clarity of presentation.
HOW TO SIGN DIGITAL STREAMS 105
DEFINITION 2. An online stream signature scheme is a triplet (G; S; V ) of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms satisfying the following properties:
† G is the key generation algorithm. On input 1n it outputs a pair (SK;PK) 2 f0; 1g2n . SK is
called the secret (signing) key and PK is called the public (verification) key.
† S is the signing algorithm. Given a (possibly infinite) stream B D B1; : : : , algorithm S with
input the secret key SK process each block one at a time, i.e.,
S(SK; B1; : : : ; Bi ) D B 0i D (Bi ; Ai )
† V is the verification algorithm. For every (PK; SK ) D G(1n) and B 01; B 02; : : : such that B 0i D
S(SK; B1; : : : ; Bi ) for all i , it holds that V (PK; B 01; : : : ; B 0i ) D 1 for all i .
Notice that in the online definition we have the signer process each block on the fly so knowledge
of future blocks is not needed. In this case the definition seems to require knowledge of all past blocks
for both the signer and the verifier; however, this does not have to be the case (indeed, in our solution
some past blocks may be discarded).
The above definitions say nothing about security. In order to define security for stream signing we
use the same notions of security introduced in [13]. That is, we require that no efficient algorithm will
be able to produce a valid signed stream, even after seeing several signed streams. However, notice that,
given our definition of signed streams, a prefix of a valid signed stream is itself a valid signed stream.
So the forger can present a “different” signed stream by just taking a prefix of the ones seen before.
However, this hardly constitutes forgery, so we rule it out in the definition. With B(1) µ B(2) we denote
the fact that B(1) is a prefix of B(2).
DEFINITION 3. We say that an offline (resp. online) stream signature scheme (G; S; V ) is secure if
any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm F , given as input the public key PK and adaptively chosen
signed streams B0( j) for j D 1; 2; : : : , outputs a new previously unseen valid signed stream B0 6µ B0( j)
8 j only with negligible probability.
For signed streams we slightly abuse the notation: when we write B0(1) 6µ B0(2) we mean that not only
B0(1) is not a prefix ofB0(2) but also the underlying “basic” unsigned streams are in the same relationship,
i.e., B(1) 6µ B(2).
This is the definition of existential unforgeability against adaptively-chosen message attack, the
strongest of the notions presented in [13]. Following [13] weaker variants can be defined. Notice that
the adversary is polynomially bounded; thus he can query only a bounded number of streams whose
total length will also be bounded by a polynomial.
4. THE OFFLINE SOLUTION
In this case we assume that the sender knows the entire stream in advance (e.g., music or movie
broadcast). Assume for simplicity that the stream is such that it is possible to reserve 20 bytes of extra
authentication information in a block of size c.
The stream is logically divided into blocks of size c. The receiver has a buffer of size c. The receiver
first receives the signature on the 20-byte hash (e.g., SHA-1) of the first block. After verification of the
signature the receiver knows what the hash of the first block should be and then starts receiving the
full stream and starts computing its hash block by block. When the receiver receives the first block,
she checks its hash against what the signature was verified upon. If it matches, she plays the block;
otherwise she rejects it and stops playing the stream. How are other blocks authenticated? The key
point is that the first block contains the 20-byte hash of the second block, the second block contains the
20-byte hash of the third block and so on. Thus, after the first signature check, there are just hashes to
be checked for every subsequent block.
In more detail, let (G; S; V ) be a regular signature scheme. The sender has a pair of secret–public
keys (SK;PK ) D G(1n) of such a signature scheme. Also let H be a collision-resistant cryptographic
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hash function. If the original stream is
B D B1; B2; : : : ; Bk
and the resulting signed stream is
B0 D B 00; B 01; B 02; : : : ; B 0k
the processing is done backward on the original stream as follows:
B 0k D hBk; 00 : : : 0i
B 0i D hBi ; H (B 0iC1)i for i D 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1
B 00 D hH (B 01; k); S(SK; H (B 01; k))i:
Notice that on the sender side, computing the signature and embedding the hashes requires a single
backward pass on the stream, hence the restriction that the stream is fully known in advance. Notice
also that the first block B 00 of the signed stream contains an encoding of the length of the stream (k).
The receiver verifies the signed stream as follows: on receiving B 00 D hB; A0i she checks that
V (PK; A0; B) D 1
and extracts the length k in blocks of the stream (which we may assume is encoded in the first block).
Then on receiving B 0i D hBi ; Ai i (for 1 • i • k) the receiver accepts Bi if
H (B 0i ) D Ai¡1:
Thus the receiver has to compute a single public-key operation at the beginning and then only one hash
evaluation per block. Notice that no big table is needed in memory.
5. THE ONLINE SOLUTION
In this case the sender does not know the entire stream in advance (e.g., live broadcast). In this
scenario it is important that the operation of signing (and not just verification) be fast, since the sender
is bound to produce an authenticated stream at a potentially high rate.
One-Time Signatures. In the following we will use a special kind of signature scheme introduced in
[15, 16]. These are signatures which are much faster to compute and verify than regular signatures since
they are based on one-way functions and do not require a trapdoor function. Conjectured known one-
way functions (such as DES or SHA-1) are much more efficient than the known conjectured trapdoor
functions such as RSA. However, these schemes cannot be used to sign an arbitrary number of messages
but only a prefixed number of them (usually one). Several other 1-time schemes have been proposed [6,
7, 12]; in Section 7 we discuss possible instantiations for our purpose.
In this case the stream is split into blocks. Initially the sender sends a signed public key for a 1-time
signature scheme. Then she sends the first block along with a 1-time signature on its hash based on the
1-time public key sent in the previous block. The first block also contains a new 1-time public key to
be used to verify the signature on the second block and this structure is repeated in all the blocks.
In more detail, let us denote with (G; S; V ) a regular signature scheme and with (g; s; v) a 1-time
signature scheme. With H we still denote a collision-resistant hash function. The sender has long-lived
keys (SK;PK ) D G(1n). Let
B D B1; B2; : : :
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be the original stream (notice that in this case we are not assuming the stream to be finite) and
B0 D B 00; B 01; B 02; : : :
the signed stream constructed as follows. For each i ‚ 1 let us denote with (ski ; pki ) D g(1n) the output
of an independent run of algorithm g. Then
B 00 D hpk0; S(SK; pk0)i
(public keys of 1-time signature schemes are usually short so they need not to be hashed before signing)
B 0i D hBi ; pki ; s(ski¡1; H (Bi ; pki ))i for i ‚ 1:
Notice that apart from a regular signature on the first block, all the following signatures are 1-time
signatures and are thus much faster to compute (including the key generation, which does not have to
be done on the fly).
The receiver verifies the signed stream as follows. On receiving B 00 D hpk0; A0i she checks that
V (PK; A0; pk0) D 1
and then on receiving B 0i D hBi ; pkiC1; Ai i she checks that
v(pki¡1; Ai ; H (Bi ; pki )) D 1:
Whenever one of these checks fails, the receiver stops playing the stream. Thus the receiver has to
compute a single public-key operation at the beginning and then only one 1-time signature verification
per block.
6. PROOFS OF SECURITY
We are able to prove the security of our stream signature schemes according to the definitions
presented in Section 3, provided that the underlying components used to build the schemes are secure
on their own.
The Offline Case. Let us denote with (Goff;Soff;Voff) the offline stream signature scheme described
in Section 4. With (G; S; V ) let us denote the regular signature scheme and with H the hash function
used in the construction. The following holds.
THEOREM 1. If (G; S; V ) is a secure signature scheme and H is a collision-resistant hash function
then the resulting stream signature scheme (Goff;Soff;Voff) is secure.
Proof. Assume the thesis is false, i.e., that there is an algorithm F that succeeds in an existential
forgery against (Goff;Soff;Voff) using an adaptively-chosen message attack with nonnegligible probability
†. That is,F runs on input PK, adaptively asks for the signed versions of ‘ streams B(1); : : : ;B(‘) where
B( j) D B( j)1 : : : B( j)k j , and receives them; let them beB0(1); : : : ;B0(‘). ThenF outputs a valid signed stream
B0 where B0 D B 00 : : : B 0k is not a prefix of any of the previous ones; i.e., B0 6µ B0( j) 8 j D 1; : : : ; ‘. One
of the following two cases must be true.
Case 1: With probability at least †=2,F outputs a signed stream whose first block coincides with the
first block of one of the signed streams it asked for before. That is, there exists a j such that B 00 D B 0( j)0 .
We show in this case how F can be used to build an algorithm Fc which finds collisions for H .
Fc runs as follows. It first runs G to obtain a pair of public and secret keys (PK; SK). Then it runs F
and uses SK to sign all the requests B( j) for j D 1; : : : ; ‘ that F makes. Now with probability at least
†=2 F outputs B0 6µ B0( j) for all j , but such that there exists j such that B 00 D B 0( j)0 . Let k be the length
of the stream B0 and k j the length of the stream B0( j).
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If k 6D k j then (B 01; k) 6D (B 0( j)1 ; k j ). But since B 00 D B 0( j)0 it must be that H (B 01; k) D H (B 0( j)1 ; k j ).
So Fc can output the pair (B 01; k); (B 0( j)1 ; k j ) as a collision for H .
If k D k j , then since B0 6µ B0( j) there must exist an 0 < fi • k such that B 0fi 6D B 0( j)fi while B 0fl D B 0( j)fl
for all 0 • fl < fi. That is we have that B 0fi¡1 D B 0( j)fi¡1, which (by our construction of signed streams)
implies that H (B 0fi) D H (B 0( j)fi ). So Fc outputs the pair B 0fi; B 0( j)fi as a collision for H .
Case 2: With probability at least †=2, F outputs a signed stream whose first block is different from
the first block of any of the signed streams it asked for before. That is, for all j we have B 00 6D B 0( j)0 . We
show in this case how F can be used to build an algorithm Fs which forges signatures for the regular
signature scheme (G; S; V ).
Fs runs on input a public key PK of the signature scheme (G; S; V ). It is also allowed to query
a signature oracle to get signed messages of its choice. Fs starts by running F . When the latter
requests a signature on a stream B( j) D B( j)1 : : : B( j)k j Fs first prepares the last k j blocks of the
signed stream B 0( j)1 ; : : : ; B 0
( j)
k j and then it uses its allowed queries to the signature oracle to compute
B 0( j)0 D hH (B 0( j)1 ); S(SK; H (B 0( j)1 ))i.
Now with probability at least †=2 F outputs B0 D B 00 : : : B 0k such that B 00 6D B 0( j)0 for all j . This in
turn means that B 00 is a message–signature pair that Fs has not asked before to the signature oracle. Fs
stops outputting such a pair as the forged signature.
Since †=2 is a nonnegligible probability, either Case 1 or Case 2 contradicts our hypothesis, so the
thesis must be true.
The Online Case. Let us denote with (Gon;Son;Von) the online stream signature scheme described in
Section 5. With (G; S; V ) let us denote the regular signature scheme, with (g; s; v) the 1-time signature
scheme and with H the hash function used in the construction. The following holds.
THEOREM 2. If (G; S; V ) and (g; s; v) are secure signature schemes and H is a collision-resistant
hash function then the resulting stream signature scheme (Gon;Son;Von) is secure.
Proof. Assume the thesis is false, i.e., that there is an algorithm F that succeeds in an existential
forgery against (Gon;Son;Von) using an adaptively-chosen message attack with nonnegligible probability
†. That isF runs on input PK, adaptively asks for the signed versions of ‘ streams4 B(1); : : : ;B(‘) where
B( j) D B( j)1 : : : and receives them; let them be B0(1); : : : ;B0(‘). Then F outputs a valid signed stream B0
where B0 D B 00; : : : which is not a prefix of any of the previous ones, i.e., B0 6µ B0( j) 8 j D 1; : : : ; ‘.
One of the following cases must be true.
Case 1: With probability at least †=2, F outputs a signed stream whose first block is different from
the first block of any of the signed streams it asked for before. That is, for all j we have B 00 6D B 0( j)0 . We
show in this case how F can be used to build an algorithm F1 which forges signatures for the regular
signature scheme (G; S; V ).
F1 runs on input a public key PK of the signature scheme (G; S; V ). It is also allowed to query a
signature oracle to get signed messages of its choice.F1 starts by runningF . When the latter requests a
signature on a stream B( j) D B( j)1 : : : , Fs prepares the first block of the signed stream B 0( j)0 by running
g to get (pk( j)0 ; sk( j)0 ) and then queries the signature oracle to get a signature on pk0. The remaining
blocks of the stream can be easily prepared by F1 by running the 1-time key generation algorithm g as
needed.
Now with probability at least †=2 F outputs B0 D B 00 : : : such that B 00 6D B 0( j)0 for all j . This in turn
means that the B 00 is a message–signature pair for (G; S; V ) thatF1 has not asked before to the signature
oracle. F1 stops outputting such a pair as the forged signature.
Case 2: With probability at least †=2,F outputs a signed stream whose first block coincides with the
first block of one of the signed streams it asked for before. That is, there exists a j such that B 00 D B 0( j)0 .
However, we also know thatB0 6µ B0( j). This implies that there exists an 0 < fi < k such that B 0fi 6D B 0( j)fi
4 We may assume that the forger adaptively chooses the components of the stream, i.e., after seeing the i th block signed it
creates the (i C 1)st block to be signed.
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while B 0fi¡1 D B 0( j)fi¡1. Recall that, by our construction of signed streams, we have
B 0fi D hBfi; pkfi; s(skfi¡1; H (Bfi; pkfi))i
B 0( j)fi D
›
B( j)fi ; pk( j)fi ; s
¡
sk( j)fi¡1; H
¡
B( j)fi ; pk( j)fi
¢¢fi
:
We know that Bfi 6D B( j)fi . One of these two subcases must be true.
Case 2a. With probability at least †=4 the output of F is such that
H (Bfi; pkfi) D H
¡
B( j)fi ; pk( j)fi
¢
:
We show how to construct an algorithm F2 that computes collisions for H .
F2 runs as follows. It first runs G to obtain a pair of public and secret keys (PK; SK). Then it runs
F . When the latter asks to sign a specific stream, F2 uses SK to sign the first block and then generates
on the fly 1-time keys (using g) to sign all the other blocks of the given stream. Then F2 looks at the
output of F which by assumption has the property that
H (Bfi; pkfi) D H
¡
B( j)fi ; pk( j)fi
¢
and since we know that Bfi 6D B( j)fi , F2 has found a collision.
Case 2b: With probability at least †=4 the output of F is such that
H (Bfi; pkfi) 6D H
¡
B( j)fi ; pk( j)fi
¢
:
We show how to construct an algorithm F3 that forges signatures in the 1-time scheme (g; s; v).
Let us denote with K an upper bound on the total number of stream blocks that F asks during its
attempt at forgery. Without loss of generality let us assume that F always asks K blocks. Clearly K is
polynomial in our security parameter n.
F3 works as follows. It runs on input a 1-time key pk and it can ask one query to get a single message
signed by the corresponding secret key sk. Its goal is to output a different message and its signature
under sk.
F3 runs as follows. It runs G to obtain a long-lived key pair PK; SK of (G; S; V ). It then runs g several
times in order to obtain several 1-time key pairs. Finally it selects uniformly at random an integer i
between 1 and K ¡ 1.
F3 starts running F . Whenever the latter asks for a signed stream, F3 can sign the first block since it
knows SK and it uses the generated 1-time keys for the internal blocks. The exception is when F asks
for the i th block (sequentially). In this case F3 uses pk as the 1-time public key embedded in the i th
block. This means that whenF asks for the (i C1)st block,F3 has to query the signature oracle in order
to compute the 1-time signature embedded in it.
At the end of this process, F stops outputting a signed stream with the properties outlined above.
With probability 1=K the block B 0( j)fi¡1 is the one in which F3 used the target public key pk. This in turn
means that the 1-time signature contained in the block B 0fi outputted by F is valid under the key pk, yet
it is on a different message than the one queried by F3.
So with probability †=4K , which is still nonnegligible, the forger F3 succeeds.
Remark. The statements of the above theorems are valid not only in asymptotic terms, but have also
a concrete interpretation which ultimately is reflected in the key lengths used in the various components
in order to achieve the desired level of security of the full construction. It is not hard to see, by a close
analysis of the proofs, that the results are pretty tight. That is, a forger for the stream signing scheme
can be transformed into an attacker for one of the components (the hash function, the regular signature
scheme, and, a little less optimally, the 1-time signature scheme) which runs in about the same time, asks
the same number of queries, and has almost the same success probability. This in turn means that there
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is no major degradation in the level of security of the compound scheme and thus the basic components
can be run with keys of ordinary length.
More precisely, for the offline scheme, if we have a forger F that runs in time T , asks for q signed
streams of total length K , and succeeds with probability † then we have either a collision-finder Fc for
H or a forger Fs for the regular signature scheme which runs in time T , asks q signature queries and
qK hashing queries, and succeeds with probability †=2.
For the online scheme, if we have a forger F that runs in time T , asks for q signed streams of total
length K , and succeeds with probability † then we have either
† a forgerF1 for the regular signature scheme which runs in time TCKt, asks q signature queries,
and qK hashing queries and succeeds with probability †=2,
† or a collision-finder F2 for H which runs in time T C Kt, asks q signature queries and qK
hashing queries, and succeeds with probability †=4,
† or a forger F3 for the one-time signature scheme which runs in time T C Kt, asks q signature
queries and qK hashing queries, and succeeds with probability †=4K ,
where t is the time required to run the 1-time signature scheme (key generation and signature) algorithms.
7. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
7.1 The Choice of the One-Time Signature Scheme
Several 1-time schemes have been presented in the literature; see, for example, [6, 7, 12, 15, 16]. The
main parameters of these schemes are signature length and verification time. In the solutions we know
of, these parameters impose conflicting requirements, i.e., if one wants a scheme with short signatures,
verification time goes up, while schemes with longer signatures can have a much shorter verification
time. In our online solution we would like to keep both parameters down. Indeed, the verification should
be fast enough to allow the receiver to consume the stream blocks at the same input rate she receives
them. At the same time, since the signatures are embedded in the stream, it is important to keep them
small so that they will not reduce the throughput rate of the original stream.
We first suggest a scheme which obtains a reasonable compromise. The scheme is based on a 1-way
function F in a domain D. It also uses a collision resistant hash function H . The scheme allows signing
of a single m-bit message and is based on a combination of ideas from [15, 25]. Here are the details of
the scheme.
Key Generation. Choose m C log m elements in D; let them be a1; : : : ; amClog m . This is the secret
key. The public key is
pk D H (F(a1); : : : ; F(amClog m)):
Signing Algorithm. Let M be the message to be signed. Append to M the binary representation of
the number of zeros in M’s binary representation. Call M 0 the resulting binary string. The signature of
M is s1; : : : ; smClog m where si D ai if the i th bit of M 0 is 1; otherwise si D F(ai ).
Verification Algorithm. Check if
H (t1; : : : ; tmClog m) D pk;
where ti D si if the i th bit of M 0 is 0; otherwise ti D F(si ).
Security. Intuitively this scheme is secure since it is not possible to change a 0 into a 1 in the binary
representation of the message M without having to invert the function F . It is possible to change a 1
into a 0, but that will increase the number of 0’s in the binary representation of M causing a bit to flip
from 0 to 1 in the last log m bits of M 0, thus forcing the attacker to invert F anyway.
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Parameters. This scheme has signature length jDj(m C log m) where jDj is the number of bits
required to represent elements of D. The receiver has to compute 1 hash computation of H plus on the
average mClog m2 computations of F .
In practice we assume that F maps 64-bit long strings into 64-bit long strings. Since collision
resistance is not required from F we believe this parameter to be sufficient. Conjectured good F’s can
be easily constructed from efficient block ciphers such as DES or from fast hash functions such as MD5
or SHA-1.5 Similarly H can be instantiated to MD5 or SHA-1. In general we may assume m to be 128
or 160 if the message to be signed is first hashed using MD5 or SHA-1.
The SHA-1 implementation then has signatures which are 1344 bytes long. The receiver has to
compute F around 84 times on the average. With MD5 the numbers become 1080 bytes and 68 times,
respectively. When used in our offline scheme one also has to add 16 bytes for the embedding of the
public key in the stream.
Remark. Comparing the RSA signature scheme with verification exponent 3 with the above
schemes, one could wonder if the verification algorithm is really more efficient (2 multiplications
versus 84 hash computations). Typical estimates today are that an RSA verification is comparable to
100 hash computations. However, we remind the reader that we are trying to improve both signature
generation and verification. Indeed, this scheme is used in the online case and as such both operations
have to be performed online and thus efficiently. The improvement in signature generation is much
more substantial.
Other Schemes. The scheme above could be improved in the length of the signature by using
Winternitz’s idea [25]. The public key is composed of mC 1 elements of D; let them be a0; a1; : : : ; am .
The public key is pk D H (Fm(a0); F(a1); : : : ; F(am)). The signature on a message M is s0; s1; : : : ; sm
where for i ‚ 1, si D ai if the i th bit of M 0 is 1; otherwise si D F(ai ), while s0 D F‘(a0) where
‘ is the number of 1’s in M’s binary representation. The verification of the signature takes the same
amount of computation as the scheme described above. However, the length of the signature is slightly
shorter; i.e., jDj(m C 1) bits. For a SHA-1 implementation this means 1288 bytes. As noticed in [12]
the security of this scheme is based on a somewhat stronger assumption on F . Namely F is assumed
to be non-quasi-invertible; that is, on input y it infeasible to find an index i and a value x such that
FiC1(x) D Fi (y). Clearly if F is a one-way permutation the above notion is automatically satisfied.
This scheme can be further generalized as described in [12]. The message M is split in mt blocks of
size t bits; let them be M1; : : : ;M mt . The secret keys are composed of
m
t C 1 elements of D; let them
be a0; a1; : : : ; a mt . The public key is
pk D H¡F (2t¡1) mt (a0); F2t¡1(a1); : : : ; F2t¡1(a mt )¢:
The signature of a message M is computed by considering the integer value of the blocks Mi . The
signature is composed by mt C 1 values s0; s1; : : : ; sm=t where, for i ‚ 1, si D F2
t¡1¡Mi (xi ), while
s0 D F
P
i Mi (x0). In this case the signature length is jDj( mt C 1) bits, but verification time goes up with
the parameter t . Indeed, the number of hash computations goes as O( 2t mt ). Also this scheme is based
on the non-quasi-invertibility of F .
In general one has to look at the specific application and decide among the trade-offs specified by
the parameter t in order to decide if it is better to reduce the signature length or the computation time.
See Section 7.3 for other ways to deal with this issue.
7.2 Nonrepudiation
In case of a legal dispute over the content of a signed stream the receiver must bring to court some
evidence. If the receiver saves the whole stream, then there is no problem. However, in some cases, for
example because of memory limitations, the receiver might be forced to discard the stream data after
5 As a cautionary remark to prevent attacks where the attacker builds a large table of evaluations of F , in practice F could be
made different for each signed stream (or for each large portion of the signed stream) by defining F(x) to be G(Salt jjX ) where
G is a one-way 128 bit to 64 bit function, and the Salt is generated at random by the signer once for each stream or large pieces
thereof.
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having consumed it. In these cases what should the receiver save to protect herself in case of a legal
dispute?
In the offline solution, assuming the last block of the signed stream always has a special reserved
value for the hash-chaining field (say all 0’s), the receiver needs to save only the first signed block.
Indeed, this proves that she received something from the sender. Now we could conceivably move the
burden of proof to the sender to reconstruct the whole stream that matches that first block and ends with
the last block which has the reserved value for the hash-chaining field (a similar idea was used in [1] to
deal with storage limitations on low-end devices).
Similarly in the online solution, at a minimum the receiver needs to save the first signed block and all
1-time signatures and have the sender reconstruct the stream. However, in practice, this may still be too
much to save. For practical applications, we suggest the following scheme. The online stream could be
broken up into a sequence of chunks, each chunk representing a logical unit, e.g., a TV program or a live
broadcast of a game or even programming sent over some fixed sized time interval. The idea is that once a
logical unit is decided, an upper bound on the total number of blocks in it can be estimated and all the one-
time keys needed for a chunk of that size could be precomputed by the sender. In addition, by using the
offline stream signing technique, the sender can compute a single hash value which when signed can be
used to authenticate each of these 1-time public keys if they were to be sent as a stream of keys, one key in
each stream block. The new online scheme works as follows: Initially the sender sends a regular digital
signature on the hash value which can be used to authenticate a stream of 1-time public keys. The stream
of 1-time keys is then embedded in the actual online data stream and the data stream itself is authenticated
by 1-time signatures based on the 1-time keys where each 1-time signature is on the running hash of
all the data sent so far on the stream. This way the receiver only needs to store the initial regular digital
signature and the last 1-time signature that was received and verified. For nonrepudiation purposes, based
on the initial regular digital signature, the sender can be forced to disclose the entire stream of 1-time
public keys, and, based on the last valid 1-time signature stored by the receiver, the sender can be forced
to produce a data stream with the same hash as what is signed by the last 1-time signature stored by the
receiver.
7.3 Hybrid Schemes
In the online scheme, the length of the embedded authentication information is of concern as it could
cut into the throughput of the stream. In order to reduce it, hybrid schemes can be considered. In this
case we assume that some asynchrony between the sender and the receiver is acceptable.
Suppose the sender can process a group (say 20) of stream blocks at a time before sending them. With
a pipelined process this would only add an initial delay before the stream gets transmitted. The sender
will sign with a 1-time key only 1 block out of 20. The 20 blocks in between these two signed blocks
will be authenticated using the offline scheme. This way the long 1-time signatures and the verification
time can be amortized over the 20 blocks.
A useful feature of our proposed 1-time signature scheme is that it allows the verification of (the hash
of) a message bit by bit. This allows us to actually spread out the signature bits and the verification
time among the 20 blocks. Indeed, if we assume that the receiver is allowed to play at most 20 blocks
of unauthenticated information before stopping if tampering is detected we can do the following. We
can distribute the signature bits among the 20 blocks and verify the hash of the first block bit by bit
as the signature bits arrive. This maintains the stream rate stably since we do not have long signatures
sent in a single block and verification now takes three to four hash computations per block, on every
block.
It is also possible to remove the constraint on playing 20 blocks of unauthenticated information before
tampering is detected. This requires a simple modification to our online scheme. Instead of embedding
in block Bi its own 1-time signature, we embed the signature of the next block BiC1. This means that
in the online case blocks have to be processed two at a time now. When this modification is applied to
the hybrid scheme, the signature bits in the current 20 blocks are used to authenticate the following 20
blocks so unauthenticated information is never played. However, this means that now the sender has to
process 40 blocks at a time in the hybrid scheme.
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7.4 Probabilistic One-Time Signatures
The length and the computation time of a 1-time signature are determined by the length of the message
being signed. Typically the message is first hashed; thus the range of the collision-resistant hash function
is the crucial parameter here. However, in order to make sure that the function is a strong collision-
resistant one, it is necessary to assume a long range. MD5 with 128 bits is considered borderline. SHA-1
seems to give more security with a 160-bits range.
Is it possible to use a weak collision resistant hash function to hash messages instead? In the presence
of a chosen message attack this is not possible as an attacker could find two messages x and y that hash
to the same value and by obtaining a signature on x would then obtain a signature on y. It is, however,
possible to foil this particular attack by first randomizing the message being signed.
Consider the following approach. Let (G; S; V ) be a secure signature scheme (against adaptively-
chosen message attack) on a message of size b, but we want to sign messages of arbitrary length. Let
Hk be a family of weak collision resistant hash functions whose range is (b¡ jkj)-bit strings. Consider
the following new signature scheme on messages of arbitrary size. On input a message M , choose a
random k, compute h D Hk(M), and output k together with a signature on the pair k; h. We claim that
this new signature scheme is also secure against adaptively-chosen message attack. This is because the
receiver cannot use the fact that Hk is a weak collision hash function, because she does not know which
function is going to be used.
The only issue here is nonrepudiation as the signer can find collisions and when it is challenged with
a signed message M he can present another message M 0 that has the same signature. However, this is
not really a problem as one can hold the signer responsible for any signed message as only he can find
collisions. A more detailed discussion about these issues can be found in [3].
Notice that the family Hk can be easily built out of regular hash functions via “keying” techniques.
For example in iterative constructions of H , k could be used as the IV. In practice we suggest using the
first 80 bits of SHA-1 keyed via the IV with k.
The above technique does not have a particular impact with typical signature schemes as reducing the
range of the hash function is not an issue there. But with 1-time signatures this allows for some savings
in the length of the signature and the computation time. For example, with typical lengths jkj would
be say 60 bits and a weak collision hash function would be around 80 bits in range (to obtain a level
of security comparable to the 160-bit strong collision-resistant functions). So the probabilistic hashing
would return a value of 140 bits which implies a savings of almost 15% in length and computation time.
We stress that this is a general result for all 1-time signature schemes.
When applied to our stream signature scheme that improvement itself is already valuable. But in our
specific case we can improve even more as we can use the hybrid approach once again. Indeed, we
donot have to use a different k for each block. The signer could keep k fixed for a limited amount of
time. This time window should be small enough to prevent an attacker from finding collisions for the
hash function Hk which is kept fixed during this time window. If Hk is a good hash function it should
take roughly 240 steps to find such collisions. Thus a small window of a few seconds should not pose
security problems. If the rate of the stream is high enough during this time window we will sign several
blocks. Say for simplicity that we sign 20 blocks with the same k. This will allow us to spread the bits
of k on 20 blocks which means that now the probabilistic hashing returns an 83-bit value per block,
thus achieving almost a 50% efficiency improvement in signatures length and computation time!
Remark. In order to use this solution and be able to preserve nonrepudiation the recipient must
save the whole stream; i.e., the techniques described in Section 7.2 cannot be applied. Indeed, those
techniques rely on the fact that the signer cannot find a collision and thus repudiate the message he sent
to the receiver (in case the latter did not save the original message, but just its hash).
8. APPLICATIONS
MPEG Video and Audio. In the case of MPEG video and audio, there are several methods for em-
bedding authentication data. First, the video elementary stream has a USER-DATA section where
arbitrary user-defined information can be placed. Second, the MPEG system layer allows for an
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elementary data stream to be multiplexed synchronously with the packetized audio and video streams.
One such elementary stream could carry the authentication information. Third, techniques borrowed
from digital watermarking can be used to embed information in the audio and video itself at the cost
of slight quality degradation. In the case of MPEG video since each frame is fairly large (hundreds
of kilobits), and the receiver is required to have a buffer of at least 1.8 Mbits, both the offline and the
online solutions can be deployed without compromising picture quality. In the case of audio, however,
in the extreme case the bit rate could be very low (e.g., 32 Kbits/s) and each audio frame could be small
(approx. 1000 bytes) and the receiver’s audio buffer may be tiny ( less than 2 Kbytes). In such extreme
cases the online method, which requires around 1000 bytes of authentication information per block,
cannot be used without seriously cutting into audio quality. For these extreme cases, the best online
strategy would be to send the authentication information via a separate but multiplexed MPEG data
stream. For regular MPEG audio, if the receiver has a reasonably sized buffer (say 32 K) then we can
apply the online scheme with a large block size (say 20 K) to obtain a signed MPEG audio stream with
a delay of approximately 5–6 s and space overhead of 5%. If the receiver buffer is small but not tiny
(say 3 K) a hybrid scheme would work; for example, one could use groups of 33 hash–chained blocks
of length 1000 bytes each; this would typically result in a 5% degradation and a delay in the 20-s range.
Java. In the original version of Java (JDK 1.0), for an applet coming from the network, first the
startup class was loaded and then additional classes were (down) loaded by the class loader in a lazy
fashion as and when the running applet first attempted to access them. Since our ideas apply not only
to streams which are a linear sequence of blocks but in general to trees as well (where one block can
invoke any of its children), based on our model, one way to sign Java applets would be to sign the startup
class and each downloaded class would have embedded in it the hashes of the additional classes that
it downloads directly. However, for code signing, Javasoft has adopted the multiple signature and hash
table based approach in JDK1.1, where each applet is composed of one or several Java archives, each
of which contains a signed table of hashes (the manifest) of its components. It is our belief that once
Java applets become really large and complex the shortcomings of this approach will become apparent:
(1) the large size of the hash table in relation to the classes actually invoked during a run (this table has
to be fully extracted and authenticated before any class gets authenticated); (2) the computational cost
of signing each of the manifests if an applet is composed of several archives; (3) accommodating classes
or data resources which are generated on the fly by the application server based on a client request.
These could be addressed by using some of our techniques. Also the problem of how to sign audio–
video streams will have to be considered in the future evolution of Java, since putting the hash of a large
audio–video file in the manifest would not be acceptable.
Broadcast Applications. Our schemes (both the offline and the online ones) can be easily modified
to fit in a broadcast scenario. Assume that the stream is being sent to a broadcast channel with multiple
receivers who dynamically join or leave the channel. In this case a receiver who joins when the trans-
mission is already started will not be able to authenticate the stream since she missed the first block
that contained the signature. Both schemes, however, can be modified so that every once in a while,
apart from the regular chaining information, there will also be a regular digital signature on a block
embedded in the stream. Receivers who are already verifying the stream via the chaining mechanism
can ignore this signature whereas receivers tuned in at various time will rely on the first such signature
they encounter to start their authentication chain.
A different method to authenticate broadcasted streams, with weaker nonrepudiation properties than
ours, is proposed in [5].
Long Files When Communication is Costly. Our solution can be used also to authenticate long files
in a way to reduce communication cost in case of tampering. Suppose that a receiver is downloading a
long file from the Web. There is no stream requirement to consume the file as it is downloaded, so the
receiver could easily receive the whole file and then check a signature at the end. However, if the file
has been tampered with, the user will be able to detect this fact only at the end. Since communication
is at a cost (time spent online, bandwidth wasted, etc.), this is not a satisfactory solution. Using our
solution the receiver can interrupt the transmission as soon as tampering is detected, thus saving precious
communication resources.
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Signature-based Content Filtering at Proxies. Recently there has been interest in using digital
signatures as a possible way to filter content admitted in by proxy servers through firewalls. Essentially
when there is a firewall and one wishes to connect to an external server, then this connection can only
be done via a proxy server. In essence one establishes a connection to a proxy and the proxy establishes
a separate connection to the external server (if that is permitted). The proxy then simulates a connection
between the internal machine and the external machine by copying data between the two connections.
There has been some interest in modifying proxies so that they would only allow signed data to flow
from the external server to the internal machine. However, since the proxy is only copying data as it
arrives from the external connection into the internal connection and it cannot store all the incoming
data before transferring it, the proxy cannot use a regular signature scheme for solving this problem.
However, it is easy to see that in the proxy’s view the data is a stream. Hence if there could be some
standardized way to embed authentication data in such streams, then techniques from this paper would
prove useful in solving this problem.
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